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INFORMATION  AND  TIMING IN REPEATED  PARTNERSHIPS 
BY DILIP  ABREU,  PAUL  MILGROM, AND  DAVID  PEARCE1 
In a repeated partnership game with imperfect monitoring, we distinguish among the 
effects of (1) reducing the interest rate, (2) shortening the period over which actions are 
held fixed, and (3) shortening the lag with which accumulated information is reported. All 
three changes are equivalent in games with perfect monitoring. With imperfect monitor- 
ing, reducing the interest rate always increases the possibilities for cooperation,  but the 
other two changes always have the reverse effect when the interest rate is small. 
KEYWORDS:  Repeated  games, partnerships, information, timing, inefficiency, folk theo- 
rem, likelihood ratio, reusable punishments. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
IN  MANY  ECONOMIC  SETrINGS,  the possibility  of making  efficient agreements  is 
limited  by the  presence  of  imperfect  monitoring:  some  agents cannot  observe 
perfectly the  actions of  others. Often the  economic problem of  interest is 
modeled as involving  the indefinite  repetition  of some fixed strategic  situation. 
Examples  include  partnership  problems,2  oligopolistic  coordination,3  and princi- 
pal-agent  problems.4  Because the incentives  for cooperation  in these repeated 
game models depend upon players'  responding  aggressively  to indications  that 
some participants  are violating  the agreement,  anything  that makes violations 
easier to detect and punish enlarges the set of equilibrium  payoffs.5  There is 
some presumption,  then, that possibilities  for cooperation are also enhanced 
when information  about the players'  behavior can be observed  without delay 
and when players  can respond  quickly  to new information.  While that is exactly 
what happens  under perfect monitoring,  the presumption  is entirely  misleading 
for games with imperfect monitoring,  because it omits an important effect: 
When information  reporting  is delayed  or periods  of fixed action are increased, 
the  players' abilities to  devise profitable cheating strategies is  diminished. 
Frequently,  this second effect more than offsets the corresponding  limits on the 
players'  ability  to detect and punish the defector  quickly. 
We begin to model these issues in Section 2, where we develop our basic 
stochastic model of  the  Prisoners' Dilemma. There, we  establish that the 
maximum  symn7  etric  equilibrium  value is equal to the first-best  value minus an 
incentive  cost attributable  to imperfect  monitoring,  where the incentive  cost is 
1 We  gratefully acknowledge  the  research  support of  the  Sloan  Foundation  and  the  National 
Science  Foundation. We  also thank Michihiro Kandori for his research assistance and two anony- 
mous referees for helpful comments. 
2 See, for example, Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin (1989), Radner (1986), and Radner, Myerson, 
and Maskin (1986). 
3See  Green and Porter (1984), Porter (1983), and Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1986). 
4See  Fudenberg,  Holmstrom,  and  Milgrom  (1990),  Fudenberg,  Levine,  and  Maskin  (1989), 
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987), Malcomson and Spinnewyn (1988), Radner (1981, 1983), Rogerson 
(1985), Rubinstein (1979a), and Spear and Srivastava (1987). 
5See  Kandori (1991). 
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equal to a player's  gain from  defecting  divided  by a simple statistical  measure  of 
the power of the test used to detect and deter cheating.  This formula  sets the 
stage for our analysis of  the roles of  time and information  in determining 
payoffs. 
In Section 3, we enrich  our model of the Prisoners'  Dilemma  to one in which 
information  arrives  continuously  over time, the interest  rate is fixed  with respect 
to  actual time (rather than periods), and the  period of  fixed action is  a 
parameter.  Here we find a surprise:  The effects of reducing  the interest rate 
toward  zero are very different  from those of making  the periods of fixed action 
short. In the traditional  model of repeated  games  which is the basis of the Folk 
Theorem,6  it is assumed  that at the end of each period of play, all the players 
can observe all the actions taken during  that period. It then follows that both 
very  patient  players  and  very  short  periods  of fixed  action  are represented  in the 
model by an inter-period  discount  factor that is close to one, and the standard 
Folk Theorem  correspondingly  has two interpretations.  To interpret  the analo- 
gous limit theorem for games with imperfect monitoring  in both these ways, 
however,  would be wrong:  Our analysis  demonstrates  that reducing  the interest 
rates and shortening  the period  of fixed  action always lead to different  limits  for 
these games. For some parameters,  reducing  the interest rate to zero allows 
asymptotically  efficient equilibria,  but shortening the period of  fixed action 
destroys  any possibility  of cooperation. 
In Section 4, we build a model of the Prisoners'  Dilemma in which informa- 
tion arrives not continuously  or every period, but only once  every several 
periods. In the standard  repeated game model in which any information  that is 
reported  is perfect, any increase  in the number  of periods over which informa- 
tion is withheld  can only shrink  the set of equilibrium  possibilities.  Once again, 
however,  the analogy  with the complete  information  case proves  to be treacher- 
ous: When the underlying  information  is imperfect, delaying the release of 
information  can allow a higher equilibrium  payoff  for all the players.  Perhaps 
more surprisingly,  the gains that can be achieved  by delaying  information  are 
sometimes  quite large:  A t-period  delay in revealing  information  multiplies  the 
cost attributable  to  imperfect monitoring  by a  factor of  1/t,  provided the 
interest  rate is sufficiently  low. That is, if information  is revealed  only every  four 
periods,  then the cost is reduced  to 25% of its original  level. 
The conclusions in Sections 2-4  were drawn in the context of Prisoners' 
Dilemma games. The simple two-strategy  model of the Prisoners' Dilemma 
makes the statistical  problem  of detecting cheating straightforward.  In Section 
5, we tackle  the harder  technical  problem  of evaluating  equilibrium  values  when 
there are several  players  each with many  ways  to cheat in a symmetric  "partner- 
ship game." We find that the main conclusions of Section 4 as well as the 
supporting  logic have appropriate  generalizations.  In particular,  for a general 
n-player  symmetric  game with imperfect  information,  when the interest rate is 
sufficiently  low, the equilibrium  value is higher  for the case with some delays in 
6 See Aumann and Shapley (1976), Rubinstein (1979b), and Fudenberg and Maskin (1986). INFORMATION  AND  TIMING  1715 
the release of performance  information  than for the case in which performance 
information  is released as soon as it becomes available.  Also, for low interest 
rates, a t-period delay multiplies  the cost of imperfect  information  by a factor 
on the order of 1/t. 
In Section 6, we comment  on the significance  of these results  in light of some 
recent developments  in the theory  of repeated  partnerships. 
2.  INEFFICIENCY  AND  IMPERFECT  MONITORING 
We consider  a Prisoners'  Dilemma game with the following  payoff  matrix: 
C  D 
C  7,  7  |  -b,w+g 
D  w+g,-b  0,0 
A defector  from  mutual  cooperation  "gains"  g. We assume  that w, g, and b are 
all strictly  positive  and that v  > g -  b. Then, (i) defection is a dominant  strategy 
and (ii) the best symmetric  outcome is (C, C) rather than a randomization 
between (C, D)  and (D, C). 
We suppose that this Prisoners'  Dilemma game is played continuously  over 
the time interval  [0,  oo)  and interpret the payoffs in the matrix  above as flow 
rates of payoff.  If the payoff  at time t is ut, then the net present  value of payoffs 
for the whole game is NPV=  fe-rtUt  dt or, in the equivalent  mean flow terms 
that are customarily  used in repeated game theory,  r *  NPV. For example,  if the 
cooperative  strategies  (C, C) are always  played, then ut -  v  and each player's 
(mean flow) payoff  is v  as well. 
Now, suppose that information  is perfect and instantaneous  and that the 
players  can adjust  their actions at the end of each period of length t. It is well 
known that if any strategy  can maintain  cooperation  as a perfect equilibrium 
outcome in this game, then the "trigger  strategy"  (according  to which each 
player plays C until his competitor  first defects, after which he plays D) can. 
Against that strategy  by the other player, a player  who considers  defecting in 
some period can then expect to obtain a payoff of (w + g)(1 -  e-rt)  over the 
infinite  horizon,  as compared  to v  that can be obtained  by cooperating  forever. 
The existence of a-n  equilibrium  with cooperation hinges on the comparison. 
The equilibrium  exists if 
(1)  (r  + g)(1  e-rt)  v 
but not otherwise.  Thus, the equilibrium  with cooperative  play exists if and only 
if rt < ln (1 + 7r/g). Notice that t and r enter symmetrically  in this complete 
information  analysis. 
Similarly,  if information  about behavior  is reported  to the players  with a lag 
of  t, or if performance  information  is reported to players only at the dates 
t, 2t, 3t, and so on, then continual  cooperation  is an equilibrium  outcome  if and 1716  D.  ABREU,  P.  MILGROM,  AND  D.  PEARCE 
only if (1) holds. Long reporting  lags and long periods of fixed action have the 
effect of allowing  a defector to profit for a considerable  period of time before 
suffering  retaliation.  In repeated games with perfect monitoring,  longer infor- 
mation reporting  lags and periods of fixed actions  can only inhibit  cooperation. 
Next, suppose  that information  may  be imperfect.  We assume  that the players 
cannot observe past behavior directly, but instead observe a signal in each 
period whose distribution  depends on behavior in that period. In particular, 
suppose that in the game in which actions are held fixed for a length of time t, 
the probability  that the kth possible signal is realized depends on the actions 
taken:  The probability  is pk(t)  if both players  cooperate  and qk(t)  if one player 
defects. (The signal probabilities  when both defect will be irrelevant  in our 
analysis).7  We assume that p  is a strictly positive vector to ensure that the 
incentive  problem  is always  nontrivial.8 
With imperfect  information,  it may often be impossible  to find any strategies 
that support  cooperation  at every stage as an equilibrium  outcome, so we set 
about  to find  the symmetric  pure strategy  equilibrium  with the highest  payoff  for 
the two players.  (Throughout  we use "symmetric"  in the following  strong  sense: 
The equilibrium  specifies symmetric  actions after all histories.)  If the players 
can jointly  observe  a public  signal  to use for randomizations,  then there are just 
two possibilities.  The first is that there is a unique equilibrium  at which the 
players always  play Defect and each earns an equilibrium  payoff of zero. The 
second possibility is  that the best equilibrium  entails a  trigger strategy as 
follows.  The players  initially  play Cooperate,  but after each round  they random- 
ize, switching  permanently  to the (D, D)-equilibrium  with some probability  ak 
that depends on  the  signal realization k.  Notice (i)  that the  (conditional) 
probability  ak  that players who are cooperating  at some date switch to the 
(D, D)-equilibrium  at the next date depends only on the signal k observed at 
that one date and (ii) that once the players  have switched  to (D, D), they remain 
switched  forever. 
Trigger strategies, then, are described by a  vector of  probabilities a= 
(a1,  ...,  K), where K < oo  is the number of possible signals. When does a vector 
a  define an equilibrium  trigger strategy  with value v? In standard dynamic 
programming  fashion, the value v is determined  by a recursion:  It is equal to 
1 -  e -t  times the payoff earned during  the initial period plus e -t  times the 
expected continuation  payoff after the initial period, both computed on the 
assumption  that each player  adopts the equilibrium  strategy.  For the model we 
have  just described,  the value recursion  equation  is: 
K 
(2)  v =  (1  -  ert)Tr  +  e`t  E  Pk('  -  ak)V. 
k=1 
7Although we  have modeled  the payoffs separately from the  stochastic information, our model 
also encompasses the case in which the stochastic signal affects players' payoffs directly. In that case, 
the  7r's are to be interpreted as expected stage game payoffs. Analytically, our formulation helps to 
distinguish the separate effects of assumptions about information and payoffs. 
8 This shows up below in the conclusion that, at the best equilibrium, players are just indifferent 
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What about incentives?  According to the Optimality  Principle of Dynamic 
Programming,  a player has no incentive  to deviate from a proposed strategy  if 
there is no circumstance  in which a one-step deviation would be profitable. 
Plainly, it is never profitable  for the player to deviate unilaterally  from the 
trigger  strategy  when that strategy  calls for a play of D. It is not profitable  to 
deviate on other occasions  if 
K 
(3)  (7r+g)(1  -e  rt)  + e  rt  E  qk(l  -C a)V  -< V' 
k=1 
The left-hand  side of (3) is the expected payoff  to a player  who plans to defect 
once and then adhere to the equilibrium  strategy,  while the right-hand  side is 
the equilibrium  value. 
Substituting  (2) into (3), we obtain 
K 
(3')  g(1 -e  rt)  < ert  E vak(qk  -Pk), 
k=1 
a reformulation  which is sometimes  convenient. 
The analysis  to this point has been routine.  We summarize  it with a Proposi- 
tion. 
PROPOSITION  1: The trigger  strategy characterized by a  is a symmetric equilib- 
rium strategy with value v if and only if (2) and (3) hold and a  satisfies: 
(4)  O< ak  l  for all k. 
Moreover,  if  the  maximal  value  of  a  symmetric pure  strategy equilibrium is 
positive, then it is achieved by a trigger  strategy equilibrium  of this form. 
In view of the Proposition,  the maximum  symmetric  equilibrium  payoff v and 
the associated  trigger  strategy  a can be determined  from  the optimal  solution  of 
the following  linear programming  problem: 
(LP)  Max v  subject  to (2),  (3'), and 
v,  va 
(4')  O  < v  ak  <  V. 
Notice that we have written  the problem  with choice variables  v and va, rather 
than the more natural  v and a. This change of variables  makes the constraints 
(2), (3'), and (4') linear in the choice variables,  so that the program  (LP) is a 
linear program  and can be analyzed  or numerically  solved by linear program- 
ming methods. Notice, too, the feasible set (that is, the set of (v,va)  pairs 
satisfying  the constraints)  for this LP can be empty. In that case, according  to 
Proposition  1, the only equilibrium  of the game is the one in which the players 
always  defect and earn payoffs  of zero. 
From our assumption that the  probabilities p  are all nonzero, we  may 
conclude  that there  is no  equilibrium of  the  game with value  v = 7r. So,  the 
incentive constraint  (3') in (LP) must be binding, that is, it must hold with 1718  D.  ABREU,  P.  MILGROM,  AND  D.  PEARCE 
equality at the optimal solution of (LP). This fact will prove useful in the next 
Proposition. 
Given  any  feasible  solution  (v, va)  of  (LP),  we  can  determine  a  trigger 
strategy a  and an associated  likelihood ratio 1 defined as follows: 
(5)  1=  [Eqkak]/[  EPkak]. 
PROPOSITION  2:  Suppose that (LP)  has a nonempty  feasible set. If (v, va)  is a 
feasible solution for which the incentive constraint (3') holds with equality, then 
(6)  v =  T- g/(  - 1) >0. 
In particular, the payoff maximizing symmetric equilibrium  satisfies (6). 
PROOF:  We may rewrite the definition of  1 in the following form: 
(7)  lEPkakv  =  EqkakV. 
Then, substituting into (7) from (2) (for EpkakV)  and from (3) (for Eqkakv)  and 
then  simplifying yields  equation  (6).  From  (3'),  it  is  clear  that  v >  0.  From 
Proposition 1, the optimal solution of (LP) defines a payoff maximizing symme- 
tric equilibrium and, as discussed above, (3') is binding at the optimal solution. 
Q.E.D. 
There are two aspects of Proposition 2 that we wish to emphasize. First, the 
Proposition establishes that the problem of finding a payoff maximizing equili- 
brium is equivalent to the statistical problem of finding the maximum likelihood 
test which is just sufficient to  deter  defection,  that is, which satisfies (3') with 
equality.  Moreover,  any test  which  is just  sufficient  to  deter  defections  and 
which  maximizes  the  likelihood  function  corresponds  to  a  payoff maximizing 
equilibrium. 
Second, the Proposition provides a remarkably simple and intuitive character- 
ization of the optimal value itself. Equation (6) expresses the optimal value as 
the  payoff from always cooperating  minus a cost  c  incurred even  though the 
players behave  honestly  at equilibrium. Given  the  trigger strategy, the  corre- 
sponding cost that a defector would incur is lc. The  Proposition considers the 
situation where  the  extra cost  (1 -  1)c  is equal  to  the  gain  g  that  a defector 
enjoys, so that c = g/(l  -  1). The extreme cases make the interpretation of this 
formula clear. If there  is a test  to  deter  defections  that never falsely accuses 
nondefectors,  then  1 = oo and  the  deterrence  cost  at  the  associated  trigger 
strategy equilibrium is  zero.  If  defecting  is statistically indistinguishable from 
honest behavior, then  1 =  1, and regardless of the interest rate, the gains from 
cooperating, or the gains from cheating (provided g > 0), there can never be a 
feasible solution to the (LP) nor can there be any equilibrium involving coopera- 
tion. 
Let us now regard (LP) as being parameterized by the interest rate r and the 
time  interval of  fixed action  t > 0. Let  T = v(t, r)  be  the  optimal value of  the 
(LP) and let  1  = l(t, r) be the corresponding likelihood ratio. In this section, we INFORMATION  AND  TIMING  1719 
consider how changes in r affect the optimal value. Section 3 introduces an 
information  structure  that yields useful comparative  statics in t. 
To study the limiting cases which are the subject of extensions  of the Folk 
Theorem, it is helpful to examine the maximized  likelihood ratio defined by 
I(t) = maXk  qk(t)/pk(t).  In view of Proposition  2, it is clear that, regardless  of 
the  interest  rate  r, we  must have  -v(t, r) < w -  g/(l(t)  -  1), a  result which  is 
reminiscent  of the asymptotic  inefficiency  results  reported  by Radner,  Myerson, 
and Maskin  (1986) and Fudenberg,  Levine, and Maskin  (1989). However, the 
role of low interest rates can be characterized  more precisely. 
PROPOSITION  3:  For  r > 0,  -v(t, r)  is monotonically decreasing in r.  Further- 
more, 
(8)  limv-(t,r)  =r-g/[i(t)-1]  if  l(t)  > 1 +g/wr. 
If  l(t)  <  1 + g/l,  then  v(t, r) = 0  for  all  r>  0;  only  defection  can  occur  at 
equilibrium  regardless  of the interest rate. 
PROOF:  Let (v', a  )  be  feasible  for (LP) when  r = r1. Consider  r2 < r1 and 
a2  =  Oa', where 
e  rlt/  (  1  -  e-rl  t 
e  r2/  (  --r2t 
It may be directly  checked that (v ',  2vl)  is feasible for (LP) for r =  r2.  This 
establishes  monotonicity. 
It  is clear from Propositions  1 and 2  that  -v(t,  r) < max(O,  v  -  g/[l(t)  -  1]) 
and that, for all r, -v(t, r) > 0. So we need only show that limr,  O -(t,  r) > ir -  g/ 
(1(t) -  1)  if  the  right-hand-side  is  strictly positive, as we  shall henceforth 
assume.  That is, we henceforth  assume  that l(t) > (r  + g)/rr. 
By the definition  of l(t), for any sufficiently  small positive E there exists a k 
such  that  qk(t)/pk(t)  >  I(t)  -  E  >  (r  + g)/rr.  Define  1k =  qk(t)/pk(t),  v = 
nr  -  g/(lk  -1)  >  O, and aj = 0 for j s k, and set ak(t,  r) to make (3) hold with 
equality.  It is clear that as r  0,  ak  k  0. In particular,  for r sufficiently  small, 
0 < ak < 1  and then, by Proposition 1,  the  values we  have described are 
equilibrium  values. Since -v(t,  r)  is the maximal equilibrium  value, we have 
proved  that limr 4 0 -v(t,  r) > SUpk  [I  -  g/(lk  -  1)]  =  -  g/(l(t)  -  1) as required. 
Q.E.D. 
In games with imperfect  monitoring,  lower interest rates work essentially  by 
allowing  scaled-up  punishments  to be used to deter cheating.  This serves both 
to make it more likely  that the feasible set is nonempty  and, when interest  rates 
are sufficiently  small, to allow defection to be deterred with a test with the 
highest  possible  likelihood  ratio. Nevertheless,  even with very  low interest  rates, 
Proposition  2 makes  clear that the efficiency  of equilibrium  is inevitably  limited 
by the power of the best statistical  test available  to deter deviations.  So long as 1720  D.  ABREU,  P.  MILGROM,  AND  D.  PEARCE 
the best test has finite power (/(t) < oo),  the efficiency  cost of deterrence is 
bounded away  from zero, uniformly  in the interest rate r. 
3.  VARYING  ACTION  FREQUENCY 
In order to vary  the period of fixed action continuously  in a model where the 
arrival  of information  is exogenously  fixed, we must specify some "infinitely 
divisible"  distribution  for the information  process. The simplest  such specifica- 
tion, and the one we adopt, is the Poisson  process.  Thus,  we suppose that when 
the players are cooperating,  signals of a certain type arrive  stochastically  over 
time at rate A; while one player is cheating, the arrival  rate is ,u-.  We assume 
that A and ,ut are both strictly  positive  and we disregard  the precise arrival  times 
of  signals  within  a  period.9  Thus,  pk(t)  =  e-At(At)k/k!  and  qk(t)  = 
e-At  (Itt)k  Ik!. 
It  may be  that  ,ut  > A, as,  for  example, when the  events are customer 
complaints,  product failures, or industrial  accidents, which are less frequent 
when team members  work hard and incur personal  costs. Alternatively,  it may 
be that A > ,ut,  as when the events observed  are sales of a product  or discoveries 
in a laboratory  which are more frequent  when members  of the team are working 
hard. 
According  to Proposition  3, we can identify  the limiting  values of these games 
when the interest rate is small  by finding l(t). Thus, 
(9)  I(t)  =  Supe  /t/A)  e(A-  )t  if  AA. 
Applying  Proposition  3, an immediate  corollary  is the following  proposition: 
PROPOSITION 4:  For the Poisson model, 
(iT  if1, > A, 
limv(t,  r)=  0  if/,  = A, 
r I0  Max  (O,  v-gl[e(Aky)t-  1)  if A > /,. 
Notice the contrast  between the efficiency  obtainable  for low interest  rates in 
the  "bad news" case where ,ut  > A, as  compared to  the  limited efficiency 
obtainable  even for low interest rates when A > ,ut. In the "bad news"  case, the 
efficient equilibria entail triggering punishments only when several signals 
(accidents,  complaints,  etc.) are observed  in a period-something which is very 
much more likely to occur when players cheat than when they play honestly. 
Such a test can deter cheating while only rarely triggering  punishment  when 
players  are honest:  This is what makes  limiting  efficiency  possible.  In the "good 
news"'  case when A > ,t,  no such powerful statistical  tests are available.  Low 
sales, for example,  are not infinitely  more likely  when the other team members 
are shirking  than when they are working  hard. Because no strong evidence of 
9 This is justified because the number of signals is a sufficient statistic for the Poisson parameter. INFORMATION  AND  TIMING  1721 
cheating can be identified in this case, payoffs are bounded away from the 
efficient  payoff 7r uniformly  in r. 
Next, let us fix the interest rate r to see what happens  when the period of 
fixed action t  is varied. As noted in the introduction,  varying r  and t  are 
equivalent  exercises in the case of perfect information  (that is, when l(t, r) - 
+ oo). However, with imperfect monitoring,  varying t  changes l(t, r), which 
introduces  an effect that was absent in the perfect information  case. 
When r is fixed and t is small, the game may (with one minor  exception)  be 
analyzed  using first-order  approximations.  The only events with probability  of 
order t or greater  in any period of fixed action are the event that no signal is 
observed  and the event that one signal is observed.  These occur  with probabili- 
ties of approximately  1 -  At and At, respectively,  when no player cheats, and 
with probabilities 1 - ,tt  and At when one player cheats. Using these probabili- 
ties, I(t) = Max[,u /A, (1 -  ,ut)/(1  -  At)] which is approximately Max[ AL/A,  1]. It 
then follows from Proposition  3 that when A  > ,t, v(t, r) =  0 for small t, so we 
turn our attention to  the  case  u>  A. Let  a1  denote the  probability  that 
punishment  is triggered  when a single failure occurs. If all players adopt this 
trigger  strategy,  then the mean flow payoff  is approximately 
00  r *|7T  *  e-  rt e-l,Atdt  = rrr/( r + a,A). 
Cheating is therefore deterred if rg < al(p  -  A)wr/(r  + a,A),  that is, if the gain 
(in mean flow terms)  is less than the cost of the extra  probability  of punishment 
al(,  -  A). Equilibrium  is possible for some a1 <  1 if g < (,L -  A)7T/(r + A) but 
not if  g > (A -  A)w/(r + A).'0 When equilibrium  does exist, we may use the 
approximation  l(t, r)  j  ,/A  and Proposition  2 to estimate the payoff  function. 
The upshot is the following  proposition. 
PROPOSITION  5:  For  the Poisson  model,  lim, I O  v(t, r) = Tr-g/l(QIA-1)  if 
g <Q.t -  A)7T/(r + A)."1 Conversely, if  g > (  -  A)Ir/(r  + A),  then  there exists 
T > O such that v(t, r) = O for all tE (O,  T]. 
A full proof of Proposition  5 can be found in the Appendix. 
Notice that r helps determine  the possibility  of cooperation  as t grows  small, 
but not the limit equilibrium  value. It is particularly  instructive  to study  the case 
where  ,t  > A  but  g > (A -  A)7r/(r' + A).  In  that  case,  lim, I 0 v(t, P) = 0  but 
limr I Ov(t,  r) = r.  Qualitatively,  shortening the  period of  fixed action and 
reducing  the discount  rates have precisely  opposite  effects:  Reducing t makes it 
'0The  boundary  case  where g = (,  -  A)r/(r  + A) cannot  be resolved  by examining  first-order 
terms alone. An examination  of higher  order terms shows that deterrence  in this boundary  case 
would require  setting a,  slightly  greater  than unity  for small t, which  is impossible  because  a1 is a 
probability.  Hence, cooperation  cannot  be achieved  at equilibrium  for small t in this case. 
11  One can further  show  that in this case, the sign of the partial  derivative  vt(O,  r) is the same as 
that of  (0,  r)[Kg -  A)/r] -  2g.  Thus, when (A -  A)/r  is large, shorter periods of fixed action 
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impossible  to  provide  any  incentive  at  all  for  cooperation  while  reducing  r 
drives the cost of such incentives to zero! 
More  generally,  for  the  case  where  u > A,  reducing  r  always makes  full 
cooperation possible in the limit, but reducing the period of fixed action t never 
does. For the case where A < A, reducing r permits some (possibly substantial) 
cooperation  for  a  range  of  parameters,  but  reducing t  always  destroys all 
possibility of cooperation at equilibrium. Taken together, these  examples demol- 
ish the presumption that shorter periods of action are somehow similar to lower 
interest rates in a repeated game model,  at least when what is being held fixed 
are the other real aspects of the environment (observability of outcomes and the 
flow payoff matrix). 
4.  REPORTING  DELAYS  IN A PRISONERS'  DILEMMA  MODEL 
In the remainder of this paper, we develop the idea that delayed performance 
reports can  increase  the  equilibrium value,  provided that  the  interest  rate  is 
small. First, this  section  explores  a Prisoners' Dilemma  Model  with  a special 
information  structure in which  the  equilibrium strategies  and  analysis take  a 
simple form. No proofs appear here. In Section 5 we employ the same ideas to 
prove theorems applicable to general symmetric games. 
In the  present  model,  there  is a fundamental unit of  time,  called  a period, 
during which  actions  cannot  be  changed.  Information  signals  are  generated 
every period based on that period's actions, but they are revealed to the players 
only at the ends of periods  t, 2t, 3t, ....  For example, in periods 2t + 1 through 
3t,  the  players know the  history of  signals generated  through period  2t  only. 
The standard imperfect monitoring model in which signals are observed at the 
end of each period corresponds to the case where  t = 1. 
We assume that the signals observed in each period can be of only two types, 
labeled  "success"  and  "failure."  Let  A be  the  probability of  failure  if  both 
players cooperate,  and  A the  probability if exactly one  player cooperates.  We 
assume  ,u > A >  0: Failure  is  more  likely if  one  of  the  partners defects.  The 
discount factor that applies between  periods is denoted  by 8. 
For any fixed value of  t, this set-up defines a new repeated game in which, at 
each "stage," t  repetitions of the Prisoners' Dilemma  game are played. If 8  is 
close  to  one-and  given  certain  restrictions  described  below  on  the  other 
parameters that  are necessary for some  cooperation  to  be  possible-the  best 
symmetric equilibrium is a trigger strategy equilibrium in which there is coopera- 
tion in each of the t periods that make up the first stage of the repeated game. 
The optimal equilibrium strategy, as we will show, triggers noncooperation with 
probability a  only when  a "failure" occurs in  all t  periods of the  stage; when 
there is a "success" in any of the t periods, the players continue to cooperate at 
the  next  stage.  The  number  a  is chosen  to  make  the  players just  indifferent 
between  defecting in the first period of the  t-period stage and not defecting  at 
all: 
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The  left-hand  side of  equation  (10) is the  gain enjoyed from cheating for a 
single period, expressed in the same mean flow units as the equilibrium value v. 
The  right-hand  side  is  the  increased  chance  of  triggering a  punishment  by 
defecting once (rather than not defecting), multiplied by the payoff lost when a 
punishment  is  triggered.  We  shall  assume  for  now  that  there  exists  some 
a  E (0, 1] satisfying (10); a sufficient condition  for this is given in Proposition 6 
below. 
Notice  that  if  a  player  defects  during  any  X  of  the  first  t  periods,  the 
likelihood  that  a  punishment  will  be  triggered  is  1JAt'Ta.  The  ratio  of  this 
likelihood to the one when there are no defections (Ata) is (,u/A)T. This ratio is 
also  the  maximum likelihood  ratio that  could  be  obtained  in  any test  of  the 
hypothesis that the player defected in X specified periods against the alternative 
hypothesis of no defections.  So, this strategy has the remarkable property that 
the test it uses maximizes the likelihood ratio simultaneously against all possible 
single period and multi-period deviations-  by the players. 
We  shall now show that this strategy, which by construction deters  a single 
deviation  in  just  the  first  period  of  the  stage,  actually  deters  all  r-period 
deviations, where 1 <  X < t. Notice that, due to discounting, the gain in immedi- 
ate payoff to  a r-period  deviation, expressed  in mean  flow payoff terms, is at 
most  (1 -  8)rg.  The  extra cost  incurred by a  r-period  deviation,  in terms of 
increased  probability  of  punishment,  is  (ATAtT-  -  At)a7T,  which  is  at  least 
r(li-  A)A -la  T.12  Hence,  a sufficient condition for all deviations to be deterred 
is that (1 -  8)g  < (/ut  -  A)At-la  , which is implied by (10). 
By triggering noncooperation only when there are failures in each period, we 
have converted the  punishment  for defecting  in the  first period into  a lottery 
with sufficient expected value to deter that defection. It is true that a player can 
affect the  relevant lottery probabilities, but only adversely for himself.  Conse- 
quently, the test and punishments that are used to keep players in line in period 
1-and  that impose welfare losses on the players-can  be "reused" at no extra 
cost to deter defections  in periods 2 through t. 
As we argued in the discussion of Proposition 2 (for the case  t = 1), the cost 
of deterring a single deviation in the first period is g/(l  -  1),13  so the mean flow 
cost of deterring a deviation in each period is also g/(l  -  1). As we have seen, 
however,  for  general  t  and  8  close  to  one,  only  the  incentive  constraints  in 
periods  1, t + 1,2 t + 1, . . .  are binding, so the  mean flow cost of  deterrence  is 
(1 -  8)Ek=i8tk[g/(l  -  1)]. Summing this series  leads  to the  following Proposi- 
tion. 
PROPOSITION  6:  Let 1= ,u/A.  For t < g/(l  -  1)nr, v(t, 8) = 0 for all 8 E (0, 1). 
For any t > g/(l  -  1)nr, there exists Qt  E (0, 1) such that for all 8 >  t,, 
V(t,  5)  =  7T -  [5/(a  +  +,6  )]  [ g/(l  -  1)]. 
In this second case, lim,  1 v(t,  8) =T -  (1/t)g/(l  - 1). 
12 Since (A/A)  > 1, it follows that (A/A)  -  1 > r[(4/A)  -  1], from which our conclusion follows. 
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Proposition 6 establishes that longer information lags t lead to better equili- 
brium outcomes, provided that 8 is close enough to unity, and that lags may be 
necessary to achieve any cooperation  at all. If we regard t as a choice variable, 
then  the  Proposition  implies that for any fixed value of  8, there will be  some 
finite optimal information lag  t*(8),  and that t*(8)  tends to infinity as 8 tends 
to one. 
The  benefits  of  delaying the  release  of  information and the  trigger strategy 
that achieves those benefits by looking for evidence of defection  in each period 
are not special features of the  Prisoners' Dilemma  example. They are general 
properties of symmetric repeated games, as we show below. 
5.  SYMMETRIC  GAMES  WITH  MULTIPLE  ACTIONS  AND  SIGNALS 
Suppose  that in every period,  each of  n  players privately chooses  an action 
from the  set  {a1, ...  ., aH}. The  action profile determines  a probability distribu- 
tion  over  the  finite  signal space.  We  assume  that  all  signal  realizations  have 
positive probability, regardless of the profile of actions played. A player's payoff 
in  period  s  is  the  expected  value  of  a  realized  reward that  depends  on  the 
action he takes and possibly on the signal realization or other random variables. 
However,  a player's only information is the  public signal together with know- 
ledge of his own past play. The game is symmetric, and we restrict attention to 
symmetric equilibria (that is, equilibria which specify identical behavior for all 
players after all histories, even off the equilibrium path). Let 
n1ij= the single period (expected)  payoff to a player who chooses 
action ai when all other players choose  a1. 
Pijk  =  the probability of signal k when one player chooses  ai and 
everyone else chooses  a1. 
A  stage game of length  t, where  t  is a positive integer, is comprised of  t of 
the  period  games just described, but with the  following information structure: 
Players remain ignorant of signal realizations within a stage until the stage ends. 
Thus, a pure strategy for any player specifies how to behave  at each date as a 
function  of  the  signals  observed  at  the  ends  of  the  various  completed  past 
stages. It is convenient to convexify the (symmetric equilibrium) value set of the 
supergame G'(t,  8) with stage game of length t, by including at the beginning of 
each  stage a publicly observed random drawing from the uniform distribution 
on [0, 1], on which all subsequent choices by players can be conditioned. 
We  assume  for simplicity that the  stage  game has  a symmetric equilibrium 
(ab,..  .,ab)  whose payoff is normalized to zero, and consider equilibria in which 
play can be  characterized  as being  in one  of  two  states: In the  "good" state 
players use  some  action  ai  and in the  "bad" state  they use  action  ab,  where 
ij  >  'rbb =  0. Given that (ab,  ..  ,ab)  is a Nash equilibrium, the bad state can be 
taken to be  absorbing. We  limit our attention  to  repeated  game equilibria of 
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We seek to compute the maximal  value among equilibria  of this kind along 
with the strategies and implicit statistical tests that support the equilibrium. 
Recall from Section 2 that the continuation  values of the equilibrium  that 
implements  cooperation  most efficiently  can be obtained as the solution of a 
linear program  with three kinds of constraints:  A value recursion equation, 
incentive constraints,  and self-generation  constraints  (see Abreu, Pearce, and 
Stacchetti (1986)). The analogous program for the present model is  LP#1 
below, where the  choice variables w(k)  are continuation values following 
alternative t-period signal histories  k = (k1,...,  kt). 
LP#1:  Maxv  subject  to 
v,w 
(i) value recursion: 
kl@  ...  kt  s 
(ii) incentive  compatibility: 
1 -8 
V  ,7(riIj  +  52Ti2ji+  * *  +6  ij 
+86  E  (17PiJk,)w(kl*...*  kt)  for  all (i1,  i2,  ...  ,it); 
k1,  k  s 
(iii) self-generation: 
<  w(kl,...,  kt)  SV. 
Let v(j, t, 8) denote the maximized  value of LP#1. 
Given any feasible solution (v, w) of LP#1, there is a corresponding  station- 
ary symmetric  trigger strategy equilibrium  of  G'(t, 8)  in which the players 
randomize  after outcome k, continuing  in the "good" state (playing j)  after 
period t with probability  w(k)/v  and otherwise switching  to the "bad" state 
(playing b) where play remains  forever. Similarly,  any such equilibrium  corre- 
sponds  to a feasible solution  of LP#1. 
The heart of  our analysis of information  lags in the Prisoners'  Dilemma 
example was our assertion that, for  8  close to  unity, only the first-period 
incentive-constraint  is binding.  That result  was established  by examining  a very 
particular  strategy  that triggers  punishment  only if there is evidence  of cheating 
in every  period.  A related proposition  will be proved  using a similar  strategy  in 
this more general framework.  The connection  is made using the following  two 
linear programs.  The first is  obtained from LP#1  by omitting all but the 
first-period  incentive  constraints  and adding  "Separation  Constraints:" 
LP#2  max  T  subject  to 
v , x  1  ,  *  Xk 
(i') value recursion: 
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(ii') period one incentive compatibility: 
v >  (1-)7rij  +  (8-  8t)nr-1 +  8tEPijkXk  for all i; 
k 
(iii') separation constraints: 
EIPjjkXk  >  EmPijkXk  for all i; 
k  k 
(iv') one-sided  self-generation constraints: 
Xk < v  for all k. 
Notice  that  (iii')  is  never  a  binding  constraint  in  games  like  the  Prisoners' 
Dilemma in which  -ij >  rjj  for all i, that is, in which all single period deviations 
increase short-run payoffs. For those games, (iii') is implied by (i') and (ii'). 
Let  v2(j,  t, 8) denote  the optimized value of LP#2. 
Substituting (i') into (ii'), we may express the period one incentive compatibil- 
ity constraint as 
8t 
Tji  jj <  18  (Pjjk  Pijk)Xk  for all i 
1  k 
One can view the discrepancies between the continuation values and  2(j, t,  8) 
in LP#2  as fines whose  expectation  should be minimized subject to the incen- 
tive and separation constraints. In terms of the simple model of Section 2, the 
expected fine paid by an honest player is g/(l  -  1) while that paid by a defector 
is  lg/(l  -  1). For this general model,  the "fine" payable after signal k  may be 
denoted  by fk  and the expected fine paid by a player who chooses  action  i  by 
Fi. The problem can then be stated as one of minimizing the expected fine paid 
by an honest player, subject to appropriate constraints. 
LP#3  Min  EP1jjkfk  subject to 
fl,  ---tk  k 
(ii") incentive constraints: 
ij  Tjj  <  E Pijkfk  -  Pjjkfk  for all i; 
k  k 
(iii") separation constraints: 
E1Pjjkfk  <  EPijkfk  for all i, 
k  k 
(iv") nonnegativity constraints: 
fk  0  for all k. INFORMATION  AND  TIMING  1727 
Let (ffk,...*,ft)  solve LP#3 and define 
Fi  =  E  Pijk fk*,  when LP#3  is feasible. 
k 
Then,  the  formal relationship between  LP#2  and LP#3  is given by the  next 
proposition. 
PROPOSITION  7:  LP#2  is feasible if and only if LP#3  is feasible. When  both are 
feasible, their optimal values are related as follows: 
-V(  ,t, bi) =  7rij _S+  ...  +  Fj  for all 8 E (0, 1). 
PROOF:  Suppose that f *  is an optimal solution of LP#3,  and Fj =  EkPjjk  fk* 
Let 
v =  7T.. -  ,F, 
and 
1-8 
Xk=V-  St  fk  b 
Noting that f*  satisfies (ii"), (iii") and (iv"), and recalling the identity 
1-8  8 
1 -a  at  +  ..+at' 
we see that (v, x)  as defined here is feasible for LP#2.  Hence 
v2(  j,  t, 5i)  >  arj,+..  ,F 
Now consider an optimal solution (v*, x*)  of LP#2,  and define 
fk=  1-8  (v  *  ). 
It may be checked that the fk's so defined are feasible for LP#3.  Also 
V2(j,  t, 5)  =  v  =  (1-  8t)7jj  +  8EPjjkXk4 
k 
= (1  St)7jj  +  tE  Pjjkt  U  at  fk) 
<  (1 -  t)7rjj +  tv*  -(1  -  )Fj 
or 
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In our Prisoners' Dilemma  example, we  assumed that  A > A, that is,  there 
exists some statistical test that can detect a single-period deviation, even though 
the test might have little power. For this more general analysis, we require that 
the following condition hold: 
Distinguishability Condition: The  probability vector  pjj  does  not  lie  in  the 
convex hull of the set of probability vectors {pij; i #j}. 
The  Distinguishability  Condition  says that  no  player  has  a  mixed  strategy 
deviation from the  strategy j  that exactly duplicates the  distribution of signals 
associated with playing j.  If such a deviation did exist, then it would of course 
be statistically indistinguishable from honest behavior, and therefore impossible 
to  detect  and  deter.14  So,  the  Distinguishability  Condition  is  a  minimally 
necessary one for our analysis. 
PROPOSITION  8:  If  the Distinguishability Condition is satisfied,  then LP#3  is 
feasible. 
PROOF:  If  j  satisfies the  assumption,  there  exists  a vector  f  which  strictly 
separates pjj from the vectors pij, i #j,  that is, 
EPI]kfk  <  EPijkfk  for all i. 
k  k 
Since  the  pij's  are  probability vectors,  f  may be  taken  to  be  positive  in  all 
components;15 furthermore, f  may be scaled up so that (ii") is satisfied. Such an 
f  is feasible for LP#3.  Q.E.D. 
The main result of this section is Proposition 9, which provides a lower bound 
on  the  value  of  equilibria  using  action  j,  when  the  players  are  sufficiently 
patient.  The  bound  may not  be  tight,  because  it  is  not  always necessary  to 
impose the separation constraints. 
PROPOSITION  9:  Suppose LP#3  is feasible and that  rrjj  > Fj/t.  Then there exists 
at  E  (0,  1) such that for all 8 > at  a trigger  strategy equilibrium  using action j exists 
and 
v (j,  t,  8)  > TV2(j,  t,  8)  =  -rjj  _  t  Fj. 
PROOF: We  use  the  solutions  of  LP#2  and  LP#3  to  construct  a  trigger 
strategy  that  is  feasible  for  LP#1  and  achieves  the  value  specified  in  the 
Proposition. 
14 There do exist joint restrictions on payoffs and statistical information that are sufficient for our 
conclusions  and weaker  than  the  Distinguishability Assumption,  but  the  distinguishability is  the 
weakest  statistical assumption that implies our conclusion. Distinguishability is implied, for exam- 
ple, by the individual full rank condition used by Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin (1989), but does 
not imply that condition. 
15 Given any separating vector f,  the vector f +  re (where e is a vector of ones) is also separating 
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Let  (v*, x*)  be  the  optimal  solution  of  LP#2  and  let  f*  be  the  optimal 
solution  of  LP#3  with  corresponding  "expected  fines"  Fi,  as  defined  above. 
Following a  t-period outcome  (k1,...,  k,),  a switch to the  punishment state is 
triggered with probability a^  = E  Ht= 1  fk  where  E = (1 -  8)8-t/(vFjt-  1).  That 
is, w(k1,..  ., kt) = [1 -  a]v,  where  v  is the value  associated with the proposed 
trigger strategy. Note  that  a^  is a probability for 8  close  to  one,  because  it is 
nonnegative  for  all  8  and  converges  to  zero  as  8  is  increased  toward  one. 
Consequently, the self-generation  constraint (iii) of LP#1  is satisfied. 
By the value recursion equation (i), 
v =  (1  -8t)  k  +,8.kE,  (s-fi1P  5k)  (i  5-  lfk5)  v 
=  (1  -  8t)  1jj +  8tv  -  (Fj)V. 
Substituting for E and solving for  v, we obtain  v =  v*  =  v2(j,  t, 8)  = rjj -  Fj?/ 
(8 +  ..  +8t),  as required. 
Finally, we must verify the incentive compatibility constraint (ii) of LP#1,  that 
is, that a player cannot gain by deviating from action sequence (j, ... , j)  to any 
action sequence  (i1,..  ., it) in the first t periods. The change in payoff resulting 
from such a deviation is: 
t  t 
(16)  E  16S(11ij, 
-  ,j)  -6ni  jv 
s=1  s  s= 
t  t 
< (1-  6) E  Max(O,v7ij -  r7jj)  -tEitv*Fjt r1 (FiS/Fj)- 1 
s=1  [s=i 
t  t 
< (1-  8 ) E  Max  (o  , Tri  j -  Tjj  ) -tEii v*  Fjt  E  (  FislFj  -  1  ) 
s =1  _s=  1 
- (1-)  E  [Max(O,,ijs  7jj)  -  (Fis-Fj)] 
s=1 
?0. 
The first inequality follows from replacing the short-run gain to cheating by the 
maximum of  itself  and zero,  and then  removing the  discounting.  The  second 
follows from the fact that, according to the separation constraint, Fi1/Fj exceeds 
unity. The equality on the next-to-last line follows from the definition of  8.  The 
incentive constraint in LP#3  ensures that each summand in that line is nonposi- 
tive when  nrji-  -  njj  is positive, while the separation constraint implies that the 
other terms are nonpositive. Together, these facts establish the final inequality. 
This  verifies  that  the  proposed  strategy  satisfies  (i)-(iii)  and  attains  the 
desired value.  Q.E.D. 
Notice the similarities among Propositions 2, 6, and 9. In each case, the value 
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defections.  In Proposition 2, the cost is the  gain from cheating divided by the 
measure of statistical power: (1 -  1). In Proposition 6, we found that the cost is 
the same expression multiplied by a factor of 5/(0  +  ...  + 5t),  because the cost 
of deterring deviations is incurred only once in each t periods. In Proposition 9, 
the  cost  is  Fj8/(5  +  + 5),  where  the  cost  Fj of  deterring  a  first period 
deviation while  satisfying the  separation  constraint is obtained  from the  con- 
tracting problem LP#3. 
The proof of Proposition 9 uses the solutions to LP#2  and LP#3  to construct 
a trigger strategy that deters  all possible  single period  and multiperiod devia- 
tions  in the  t-period  stage  game. We  have  already seen  how deterring single 
period  deviations in the first period can deter  all single period  deviations and 
certain multiperiod  deviations.  Indeed,  one  can infer from Proposition  9 that 
when  a player has only profitable deviations,  it is never more  costly to  deter 
multiperiod  deviations  than to  deter  single  period  deviations-the  separation 
constraints are never binding in that case and can be omitted. However, when a 
player has some unprofitable single period deviations, it may still be necessary 
to consider how their play affects the probability of punishment, because  they 
could  otherwise  be  played  as  part  of  some  multiperiod  deviation  that  is 
profitable  in  total  but  that  uses  the  unprofitable  deviations  to  reduce  the 
probability of triggering a punishment. The separation constraints preclude this 
by ensuring that there  is  no  single period  deviation that can ever reduce  the 
probability of punishment. 
The  following  Corollary is  a  straightforward implication  of  Proposition  9. 
Note  that when  action  ai  is  Pareto  efficient,  the  Corollary is  an  asymptotic 
efficiency result. 
COROLLARY:  Suppose that  -rjj  > 0  and the Distinguishability Condition holds. 
Then  for any E >  0, there exist t and 8E  E (0, 1) such that, for all 8 >8, 
vt6j)  > 7jji-  ? 
6.  DISCUSSION 
According to one standard interpretation of the Folk Theorem, if players can 
react quickly to one another's choices, then the possibilities for cooperation are 
improved, because the discounting between periods becomes small. Our conclu- 
sions expose the limits of this sort of reasoning, showing that when monitoring is 
imperfect,  short  periods  can  make  it  costly  or  even  impossible  to  provide 
effective  incentives.  Intuitively,  shorter  periods  of  fixed  action  and  frequent 
performance  reports  multiply  the  ways  that  players  can  deviate  from  the 
equilibrium strategies. The need  to deter these  extra deviations raises the cost 
of  deterrence.  To  draw an analogy to principal-agent theory, frequent perfor- 
mance reports in a repeated  game is like performance information that arrives 
during a  period  in  a  principal-agent model:  It  helps  the  agent  to  find more 
effective  cheating strategies but serves no beneficial purpose  for the  principal INFORMATION  AND  TIMING  1731 
(see  Holmstrom  and  Milgrom (1988)).  The  mathematical  connection  between 
principal-agent models and repeated partnership games is established in Propo- 
sitions 7 and 9. 
We have performed our analysis in the context of the symmetric equilibria of 
a  repeated  partnership  game.  Subsequent  papers  (Fudenberg,  Levine,  and 
Maskin  (1989),  Matsushima  (1989))16 have  shown  that  the  results  for  low 
interest rates and symmetric equilibria in these  games may be misleading for a 
different reason: It may be possible to construct asymmetric equilibria in which 
the  cost  of  punishments  is  much  lower  than  at  any  symmetric equilibrium. 
Again, the powerful theorems in these papers should be interpreted as ensuring 
asymptotic efficiency  as  interest  rates  decline  to  zero,  but  not  necessarily  as 
periods of fixed action or information lags grow short. 
Our examples and propositions clearly demonstrate several points. First, low 
interest rates, short reporting lags, and short periods of fixed action are distinct 
assumptions that merit distinct treatment in games with imperfect monitoring. 
Second, when monitoring is imperfect, short reporting lags and short periods of 
fixed action are not generally conducive to cooperation. Finally, when modeling 
a given partnership or oligopoly as a repeated game, one ought to consider not 
only  the  players' abilities  to  adjust their  actions  but  also  the  timing of  their 
information flows. An artificial identification of the periods of fixed action and 
fixed information can produce seriously misleading results. 
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APPENDIX 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION  5: Consider  any sequence {ak(t)).  If it defines an equilibrium,  then by 
Proposition  1, 
g(e  -  1)  <  (Q  -  P)V 
where Q =  Ekak(t)qk(t)  and P =  Ekak(t)pk(t).  Equation (ii') of LP#2  and (iii) of LP#1  imply 
gP 
Q -P 
Together with the earlier inequality this yields 
g(er  -b1)  <Wa  a(Q  - P) - g Pi 
16An early  paper  by Williams  and Radner  (1987)  makes  a related  point in a static  model. 1732  D.  ABREU,  P.  MILGROM,  AND  D.  PEARCE 
Expanding terms and dividing through by t, 
( r+  +  )  7[  t  (e  L  -e  At)  +aj(t)(e  -Ata  -e-AtA) 
2 
_,yt  -At  A2t)  +a2(t)(e/Lt'  ~-eA-  + 
a,"(t)  AtA  A2t 
e  [t  + al(t  )e AtA + a2(t  )e A  -t_  +  *  ] 
By Proposition 1, a  defines an equilibrium if and only if a  satisfies (*)  and (4) 0 <  ak(t)  <  1 for all 
k.  First, note  that if  A > bt, there  exist no  a  which satisfies (*)  and (4) for small  t.  Assume  that 
bt > A. Then,  there exists T' > 0 such that for all  t E (0, T'], if  a  satisfies (4) it satisfies (*)  only if 
al(t)  > 0. For a*  which defines a payoff maximal equilibrium this implies that (see  Proposition 2) 
a*(t)  =  0 and a4(t)  =  1, k =  2,3 ....  Hence  a*(t)  is determined by: 
r+2  )  - 
<Tr  [a((t)(eLtbt  _e-A'tA) 
+(e-'uIt  -e-A  t)  + 
9  [al1(t  )e  -AA  + e -At  -  +*** 
If (A  -  A)  < (r  + A)g,  it is clear that for small enough  t, a'  (t)  as determined by (* *) exceeds  1. 
Except for the  case  (a  -  A)7r  =  (r  +  A)g,  this establishes  the  second  half of  Proposition 5. In the 
case  of  strict equality, c  (O) =  1. Differentiating  (* *),  evaluating right-hand derivatives at  t = 0, 
substituting c  (O) = 1 and simplifying, we obtain 
2i7(o)(At  -A) 
da 
= gr2 + (bt -A)(A,  v(o)  + bT7),  dt  t=o 
where 
gA 
j  -A 
if (  -  A)iT >  (r  + A)g. It follows that if (At -  A)IT <  (r  + A)g,  there exists T > 0 such that ac(t)  > 1 
for all t E  (O,  T]. 
Conversely, if  (At -  A)7 >  (r + A)g,  then  for  small enough  t,  a*(t)  E (0, 1)  as  required for  an 
equilibrium. Also, 
zoo  z.O.oo  P(t)  t  T  At A 
This establishes Proposition 5.  Q.E.D. 
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